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The present Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a plaintiff’s case to be attacked either 
for its legal or factual sufficiency.  The rules governing the former are in general adequate 
because judgments on the validity of claims do not require any discovery.  Decisions before trial 
on factual matters are much more complex, especially in antitrust cases where discovery before a 
summary judgment motion can be highly expensive on open-ended claims of collusion over 
prices or territories.  To counteract that risk, all courts today allow some judgments to be entered 
at the close of pleading and before discovery.  As illustrated by the recent Second Circuit 
decision in Twombly v. Bell Atlantic, practice on this question is inconsistent.  A sound analysis 
of the relative error costs of stopping too soon or going too far suggests that courts should be 
more willing to enter final judgments at the close of the pleadings, especially in those cases 
where plaintiffs’ claims, when based only on easily accessible public information, are effectively 
rebutted by the same kinds of public evidence. 
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Motions to Dismiss Antitrust Cases: Separating Fact from Fantasy 
 
Richard A. Epstein 
 
1. Introduction:  Legal and Factual Uncertainty under the Federal Rules  
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938 with great fanfare, and their 
introduction was celebrated as an obvious advance over the earlier rules of procedure that were 
embodied in the standard codes.
1  Key to that system were new rules that governed first pleading 
and then discovery prior to trial.  These rules were drafted with reference to the litigation most 
common at the time, such as actions on promissory notes, negligence suits for traffic-intersection 
collisions, actions on promissory notes and patent infringement cases.
2  All of these are set out 
with model complaints that take a sentence or two to set out, and turn on one or two key facts: 
was the money owed, did the defendant run the traffic light and so on.  Like every procedural 
system, the modern rules of civil procedure had to make room for three sorts of attacks on the 
pleadings contained in the plaintiff’s complaint: the defendant had to be able to claim that the 
complaint did not state a cause of action on which relief could be granted; the defendant had to 
be able to deny the factual charges that were made; and the defendant had to be able to introduce 
new matter that would either justify or excuse the allegations in question.
3 
  All three of these issues could arise in the full range of litigation.   In automobile cases, 
the defendant could move to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action if the plaintiff does not 
allege negligence.  Or the defendant could move to dismiss on summary judgment by proving 
that his car was not involved in the collision.
4  Or the defendant could introduce an affirmative 
defense such as contributory negligence to bar or diminish the plaintiff’s claim.  In dealing with 
these issues, the basic position was that all the legal questions going to the sufficiency of the 
complaint could be decided on a motion on the pleadings before discovery, but that motions to 
defeat the claim on factual issues could be made only by a motion for summary judgment after 
discovery had been conducted, usually in a relatively compact time frame, given the nature of the 
underlying dispute.   
                                                 
1 For a brief account and praise of the “liberal” elements of the Federal Rules, see, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., Geoffrey 
C. Hazard, Jr., & John Leubsdorf, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.7 (4th ed. 1992).  For the liberal rules on pleading, see id at 
§§ 3.1, 3.6. 
2 See F.R.C.P. Forms 3 through 18. 
3 On which see F.R.C.P. Rules 8(b) and 8(c) (establishing standards for denials and affirmative defenses). 
4 See F.R.C.P. Rule 56. 2 
  The same structural issues arise in fact in dealing with modern litigation of the sort that 
received little attention when the Federal Rules were formulated.  In this instance, I will 
concentrate on antitrust cases, but the arguments made here apply to other forms of litigation, 
including suits brought against government officials for various constitutional violations, or suits 
brought against private defendants for violations of, say, the antidiscrimination laws, which turn 
on complex evidence of party motive on the one hand and industry structure on the other.   
Once we move to modern complex litigation, however, the fact/law distinction that 
organizes the federal rules does not work as well as it does in the simpler cases that animate the 
Federal Rules. Looking at the antitrust laws under the Sherman Act, for example, there is a 
genuine difference of opinion as to whether certain types of behaviors should be allowed.
5  These 
cases ask such questions as whether it is unlawful for firms to lower prices below their marginal 
costs of production, to tie the sale of one good to the sale of another, or to impose territorial 
restrictions on their retailers.
6  These issues are typically decided on motions to dismiss the 
complaint, or on motions to strike particular kinds of affirmative defenses from the responsive 
pleadings.  The factual issues are usually stipulated because the challenged practices or 
contractual provisions are all public knowledge.  Once the legal issues of principle are resolved 
one way or another, then a judgment on liability will usually follow. This dismissal for failure to 
state a cause of action has in fact little relevance in modern Section 1 Sherman Act cases dealing 
with price fixing or territorial division, because every plaintiff knows how to draft a complaint 
that says that the named defendants agreed to collude with each other in setting prices or dividing 
markets within specified geographical and temporal limits. 
                                                 
5 The two sections read: 
"Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person 
who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand 
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the 
court. 
 
"Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person, or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by 
fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said 
punishments, in the discretion of the court." 
6For my skeptical views on these questions, see Richard A. Epstein, Monopoly Dominance or Level Playing Field? 
The New Antitrust Paradox, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 49 (2005). 3 
  In this paper, I shall not discuss any cases that raise these substantive questions.  Instead I 
shall turn my attention to the cases of price-fixing and territorial division in which there is no 
dispute over the legality of certain types of practice, but genuine uncertainty whether these have 
taken place at all.  It is commonplace within the antitrust law to note that price-fixing and 
territorial divisions are subject to a per se rule of liability—or, more accurately, often require 
very specific justifications before they may be held legal.  In most litigated cases, these 
justifications are far from the scene, so that the only question is whether the events in question 
have occurred.  The hard legal question concerns what types of rules should be used to decide 
whether these claims of price-fixing or territorial division should progress to the next stage.   
As a matter of first principle, that question involves some estimation of whether the 
strength of the plaintiff’s case is strong enough at each decision point to warrant a further 
investment of social resources, and a further strain on the defendant’s resources in dealing with 
these matters.  My basic thesis is that the 1938 rules of civil procedure are not well suited to the 
complexities of modern litigation, in antitrust law and beyond.  Although courts have recognized 
the need to make some limited review of the factual underpinnings of a case, they have not 
attempted to make any systematic cost benefit analysis of going forward with litigation.  In 
general, as the costs of discovery have mounted, the case for terminating has gotten ever 
stronger, and should be done, especially in those cases where the plaintiff relies on public 
information, easily assembled and widely available, that can be effectively rebutted by other 
public evidence. 
The stakes are enormous in antitrust where the underlying wrongs are often confused 
with perfectly legal conduct.  It is accepted on all sides that simple parallel conduct among 
defendant firms in the same industry is not evidence of any form of collusion, because such 
behavior is what is expected in all markets, regardless of structure.  Quite simply, the unilateral 
actions of buyers searching for the lowest price will bring prices into equilibrium regardless of 
collusion or market structure. It is vital not  to draw negative inferences from mere parallel 
behavior in any antitrust context.  Any such legal rule would impose direct costs on business 
firms as management has to fight the major distractions of litigation, and it imposes dead-weight 
costs on the economy, by soaking up resources in rent-seeking litigation. More significantly, 
entry, pricing, marketing and other business decisions would be colored by a dismissal rule that 
opens all American businesses to unsubstantiated allegations of conspiracy to restrain trade. 4 
Parallel behavior is part of the dynamic competitive market processes. It is far more likely to be 
the consequence of sound unilateral business judgments than any supposed conspiracy. The 
prospect that the pro-competitive actions of competitors could support class-action treble damage 
antitrust litigation in many contexts would discourage sellers responding to market signals.  In 
any dynamic market, we want firms to mimic the rational conduct of rivals, which they are less 
likely to do if they fear endless vistas of antitrust liability.  Yet just those risks and more are 
created when it takes virtually no significant, coherent evidence to override what all parties on all 
sides of antitrust cases concede to be the valid rule, namely, that mere parallel conduct in no way 
raises any antitrust implications. 
  In dealing with this problem of proof, the law will only be able to achieve its appropriate 
ends if it develops reliable and efficient evidentiary rules and standards to distinguish between 
competitive and anticompetitive behaviors.  In setting out these rules, it is necessary to remain 
cognizant of the brute reality that the legal system must always deal with two kinds of error. The 
first type brands as collusive firms that are in fact in competition with each other.  The second 
type allows firms that engage in collusive practices to escape detection.  On any sensible view, 
both types of errors matter so that the Federal Rules should take great care in finding the best 
way to discriminate between the two types of market practices.   
In making these calculations, however, it is incorrect to assign equal weight to the two 
kinds of error.  Efforts of collusion are often unstable, and are frequently susceptible to 
correction by new entry, as happens when firms in a cartel cheat by establishing a collusive 
price, or when new firms enter the market under an umbrella created by the high cartel prices..  
In contrast, competitive practices that are wrongly condemned as collusive are not subject to the 
same measure of self-correction. If subjected to an antitrust ordeal, these firms—even if they 
prevail after expensive litigation—will be punished for doing exactly what the law wants to 
encourage.  No amount of private entry, moreover, will be able to mitigate the damages that the 
legal system can cause by allowing litigation to disrupt the operation of a competitive market.  
Accordingly, there is very good reason to be careful of any lax system of pleading or proof that 
invites a high rate of false positives. 
  Unfortunately, the basic thrust of the Federal Rules is against this point of view because it 
requires at the pleading stages only “very spare” allegations to meet the pleading burdens.
7  The 
                                                 
7 James et al., at 145.  5 
nub of the problem stems from needing to decide what must be established at each stage of a 
case in order to warrant its dismissal with prejudice—a decision that the original Federal Rules 
made with respect to the limited menu of cases that was foremost in the minds of the drafters.  In 
approaching this structural question with a fresh eye, it is critical to examine the roles of two key 
provisions of the Federal Rules.  One key provision is Rule 8(a), which provides simply that the 
“[g]eneral [r]ules of [p]leading” require “(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Note that this rule, as drafted, is intended to set up a dispute 
of the legal sufficiency of the complaint, and not its factual adequacy.  Indeed, the articulation of 
the rule does not even use the word “facts” or mention anything about the specificity of the facts 
so required.  Rule 8(e)(1) adds to the mix by stating that “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be 
simple, concise, and direct.”  Once again there is no requirement for any degree of factual 
precision as to time, place, persons or events.  There is only one provision in the Federal Rules—
Rule 9(b) dealing with fraud, mistake and condition of the mind—which takes the matter one 
step further.  “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or 
mistake shall be stated with particularity.”   Why specificity is expressly required in this case, 
and no other, is never made clear.  The probable negative inference from this proposition is that 
cases that involve none of the above, including all complex antitrust litigation, do not require that 
specificity.   
The basic argument in support of this view is that the pleadings serve only to give “fair 
notice” to the defendant that certain charges are against it so that it can prepare for trial.  The 
bulk of the action lies in discovery and pretrial motions.
8  The common view is that the specifics 
should come out in an open-ended discovery process that allows both interrogatories and 
depositions, which may be directed toward “any matter” relevant to the case.  Note that the 
relevant information, broadly defined, “need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery 
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”
9  The scope of 
the discovery is shaped therefore by the ambition of the pleadings.   
At the end of the pre-trial process, the basic structure of the Federal Rules does allow for 
a dismissal of the case on the facts before trial under Rule 56.  These motions can be made at any 
time, but they result in success for the moving party only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
                                                 
8  Id at 137-138 Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 116 (2d Cir. 2005). 
9  F.R.C.P. Rule 26(b)(1). 6 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.”
10  That last phrase does not refer to the sufficiency of the claim as a matter of 
legal theory, but only is intended to make clear that the standard for summary judgment is such 
that no reasonable jury could find against the moving party.  More importantly, the motion for 
summary judgment will be routinely defeated if made before the plaintiff has its opportunity to 
conduct depositions and place interrogatories to the defendant.  In the routine automobile 
accident, this delay may well make sense.  In the context of vast antitrust litigation, the toll from 
discovery in all its forms can be great, so the pressure is clearly on to see if there is some way to 
obtain a final judgment before the discovery process begins in at least some cases.  The same 
rules of discovery that generate one or two days worth of litigation in simple contract disputes 
open up just about every record of huge national companies over years if not decades.  The 
soundness of any regime that governs the relationship between pleading and discovery is highly 
sensitive to matters of scale and scope.  This issue is not confined to antitrust.  The same 
concerns have been raised in connection with suits against local governments, where the prospect 
of discovery before summary judgment has also been the source of much concern.
11  I see no 
reason why the same concern does not arise in connection with suits against large firms that are 
subject to multiple suits by huge numbers of persons that dwarf the exposure of local 
governments who are answerable only to their own citizens.  In both sets of cases the obvious 
shortfall of the Federal Rules is that they are drafted in ways that wholly ignore these 
considerations.   
The inefficiency built into the basic design of the Federal Rules has provoked some 
judicial response by courts that seek to redress this critical imbalance.  The doctrinal tools 
available to deal with this issue are as limited as the problem is serious.  The effort to handle the 
problem of too much discovery boils down in practice to the delicate issue of whether Rule 8, 
which is directed to the sufficiency of the pleadings, can be brought to bear in cases where the 
challenge is to the adequacy of the underlying facts.  Read literally, Rule 8 does not leave any 
                                                 
10 F.R.C.P. Rule 56(c). 
11 See, e.g., Futernick v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1058-59 (6th Cir. 1996) dealing with possible suits for 
selective prosecution against local landowners:  “Determining ‘all relevant aspects’ of similar situations usually 
depends on too many facts (and too much discovery) to allow dismissal on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  If we require 
defendants to wait until summary judgment, we burden local and state officials with the regular prospect of ‘fishing 
expeditions’ and meritless suits.”  7 
avenue open for a defendant to have a case dismissed on the ground that it lacks any credible 
factual evidence to support it.  In principle, therefore, it looks as though Rule 56 is the only route 
for pretrial dismissal because of the want of proof. The great drawback of that procedure is that it 
allows the plaintiff to extort a positive settlement in a worthless case, by inaugurating the 
extensive discovery proceedings. 
 
2. The Challenge of Twombly  
 
This critical question has not yet reached the Supreme Court.  But the lower courts that have 
dealt with this issue have found wholly unappetizing the rigid division between fact and law that 
looks to be built into the Federal Rules.  Hence they have eroded the formal distinction between 
summary judgment and motions to dismiss on the pleadings.  Notwithstanding the ‘liberal” 
pleading requirements of the Federal Rules, an extensive and confusing body of case law has 
developed as to when a case can be dismissed on the strength of the record as it stands before 
any discovery is undertaken.   
This matter has recently come to a head in the important case of Twombly v. Bell 
Atlantic,
12 an antitrust case that tests the relationship between the Telecommunications Act of 
1996
13 and the Sherman Act.  Some background information is needed to place the matter in 
context. Some twenty-five years ago the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
(“AT&T”) operated as a unified telephone system that enjoyed a statutory monopoly within the 
United States.  In consequence of litigation that the Department of Justice brought against 
AT&T, a judicially ratified settlement broke up AT&T into seven local operating companies, 
each of which was given exclusive statutory right to supply local phone service within its 
designated territory.
14  In addition, a competitive long-line industry developed along side, or on 
top of, these local phone companies in order to complete the telephone grid.  This combined 
system was not easy to operate, but was subject to extensive legal disputes dealing with the 
scope of the initial consent decree and the various rates for interconnection between the various 
                                                 
12 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005). 
13 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. 
14 United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 
U.S. 1001 (1983). 8 
elements of the system.
15  In addition, Congress and the public became progressively 
disenchanted with the rigid monopolies at the local exchange level, and so it desired to open up 
to competition.   
In response to the perceived rigidities of this system, the 1996 Telecommunications Act 
brought about a major restructuring of the industry which was intended to introduce competition 
at the local exchange level by encouraging new Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs) 
to enter into competition with the incumbent carriers (ILECs), either through interconnection, 
resale or the purchase of unbundled network elements.
16 The FCC was given extensive power to 
implement the 1996 Act both by drafting regulations and through direct administrative 
oversight.
17  The 1996 Act also preserved private rights of action under the antitrust laws,
18 
without addressing the question of how those antitrust actions should be modified to take into 
account the extensive level of oversight offered by the FCC and the state public utility 
commissions. 
The plaintiff class in Twombly sought to take advantage of the antitrust laws by claiming 
that the four major local exchange carriers—Bell Atlantic (now Verizon), Bell South (now being 
acquired by SBC turned AT&T), Qwest Communications International, and SBC (instantly 
rechristened AT&T after the merger), colluded to block the competitive entry within the 
industry.  The first of its allegations is that the ILECs have conspired together to block any 
CLEC from entering any of their respective territories.  Its second allegation is that all the 
defendants have agreed not to enter into each other’s territory as CLECs, in order to preserve 
each other’s monopoly, and to signal to potential CLEC entrants that it was unwise for them to 
try to break up the ILEC monopoly position anywhere throughout the system.  The alleged 
conspiracy is said to have started from February, 1996 with the passage of the 1996 Act.  The 
plaintiff class, however, alleged no direct evidence of agreement, save arguably one isolated 
public comment six years later, but pointed instead to public, inherently innocent facts such as 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d 460 U.S. 1001. (1983)(dealing with the 
original breakup); United States v. Western Electric Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057, 1123-24 (1983)(implementing the 
breakup); United States v. Western Electric Co., 908 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(interpreting line of business 
restrictions. . 
16 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252. 
17 Id. 
18 The Telecommunications Act of 1996,. Pub. L. 104-104, Title VI, § 601(b)(1), Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 143, which 
deals with private rights of action.  That provision is not codified in the United States Code, except in the notes 
to 47 USC 152. 9 
their contiguous territory and the clear gain that each side is said to gain from having as little 
competition as possible.
19 
In one sense, it seems clear that these allegations (which I shall examine more closely 
later on) meet the requirements of Rule 8 insofar as they put the defendant on notice of the nature 
of the claim and the time and place of the challenged conduct.  But at the same time the thinness 
of the evidence led Judge Lynch in the District Court to grant the motion to dismiss on the 
ground that these bare-bones allegations contained no specifics as to when the conspiracy was 
formed, or how it operated, even under the liberal pleading rules of Rule 8.
20  In so doing, the 
District Court was sensitive to the dangers of inferring conspiracy from parallel conduct.  
This inquiry [into parallel behavior] is admittedly difficult to distinguish 
from the factual analysis that is more appropriate to summary judgment, as 
is evidenced by the fact that cases involving motions to dismiss often cite 
summary judgment cases in support of their conclusions that plaintiffs 
have not alleged sufficient facts.
21  
 
It then held that the plaintiff “must allege facts to support claims of conspiracy, even in light of 
Rule 8.”
22  The fact requirement that had been written out of Rule 8 was in effect read back in 
again.   
That decision was in turn reversed unanimously in the Second Circuit.  Yet it did not do 
so on the ground that all questions of fact necessarily had to be raised only at the summary 
judgment stage.  Rather, it too thought that it was proper for questions of fact to creep back in at 
the motion to dismiss stage, but changed the standard by which that was to be judged, going to a 
minimalist standard such that “[t]he factual predicate that is pleaded does need to include 
conspiracy among the realm of plausible possibilities.”
23  The Second Circuit did not rule out the 
possibility that a summary judgment motion could have proved relevant, after discovery.
24 
Nonetheless, Judge Sack, writing in the Second Circuit, was far from confident that he had done 
the right thing, given the uncertain state of the law, for he wrote: 
We are mindful that a balance is being struck here, that on one side of that 
balance is the sometimes colossal expense of undergoing discovery, that such 
costs themselves likely lead defendants to pay plaintiffs to settle what would 
                                                 
19 See Twombly, 313 F.Supp.2d at 178 
20 Twombly, 313 F. Supp. 2d  at 187-89. 
21 Id at 182. 
22 Id at 181. 
23 Twombly, 425 F.3d at 111. 
24 Id at 114. 10 
ultimately be shown to be meritless claims, that the success of such meritless 
claims encourages others to be brought, and that the overall result may well be a 
burden on the courts and a deleterious effect on the manner in which and 
efficiency with which business is conducted. If that balance is to be re-calibrated, 
however, it is Congress or the Supreme Court that must do so.
25 
 
In my view, there is little need for this Jeremiad.  There is of course no doubt that either 
Congress or the Supreme Court have the last say on whether this case should or should not 
proceed to discovery.  But in the interim any lower court should use its own judicial power to 
determine what it thinks to be the best rule under the circumstances.  Unless the Second Circuit 
thought the decision below was incorrect on the merits, it could have upheld that decision, and 
retained the signal it issued to the Supreme Court that the entire matter is ripe for Supreme Court 
resolution.   In this particular instance, the District Court devised a procedure that in fact 
imported into a judgment on the pleading a useful variation of the test for summary judgment 
motions articulated in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.
26: 
To survive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a 
plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 [of the Sherman Act] must 
present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that the alleged 
conspirators acted independently.  Respondents in this case, in other 
words, must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of 
the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that 
could not have harmed respondents.
27 
 
As stated, this test requires the plaintiff to present evidence “that tends to exclude”—not 
“necessarily exclude”—the possibility of lawful conduct. The conspiracy alleged in Matsushita 
raised a predation case not a price-fixing case.
28  In this setting, the lower prices that were 
charged by the defendants—unaccompanied by other evidence—did not tend to exclude the 
possibility of lawful competition, since firms in an industry always have an economic incentive 
to lower their prices if they think that they can thereby gain market share.  In order to make good 
on this challenge, Matsushita and its progeny have required plaintiffs to introduce some “plus 
factor” to pick out those cases that survive a motion for summary judgment from those that do 
not.  A plus factor is any form of evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that individuals 
                                                 
25 Id at 117. 
26 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
27 Id at 588 (citation omitted). 
28 Id at 577-78. 11 
work independently.
29  It could, for example, be in ordinary price-fixing cases evidence that 
representatives of the defendant all converged on some out-of-the-way location for a secret 
meeting; or it could be an econometric study which indicated that the prices in an industry took 
an unexpected jolt upward that could not be explained by any unilateral decisions of firms within 
the industry to reduce their own individual capacity in the face of an overhang in the market.  
The conceptual challenge in Twombly is whether that tend-to-exclude standard can be 
carried over from the summary judgment stage to the earlier motion to dismiss stage under Rule 
8.  On this point there was a vital division of opinion. Before it was reversed the District Court 
had been prepared to take the plunge in order to make some factual review of the case. “While 
the Second Circuit's case law on parallel conduct conspiracies has developed mainly in the 
context of summary judgment, district courts have required that plaintiffs allege plus factors in 
order to withstand motions to dismiss as well.”
30 The Second Circuit did not disagree with that 
assumption:   
We acknowledge that district courts have occasionally elided the 
distinction between the standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 
motions on the basis of a well-founded concern that to do otherwise would 
be to condemn defendants to potentially limitless "fishing expeditions"— 
discovery pursued just "in case anything turns up"—in hopes, perhaps, of 
a favorable settlement in any event.
31  
 
Nonetheless, it refused to allow the blurring of the older pleading lines.
32 
 
3. A Decision Theoretical Approach   
 
In grappling with this issue, it is useful to think of it as a decision theory question.  Once 
a complaint is filed, a district court must make some decision as to whether to stop the case or 
allow it to go forward.  On that issue, the Second Circuit, with its stress on “fair notice” of the 
claim, in effect allows discovery to commence in the absence of evidence of any particulars.  
After all, the defendants have some notice of what to expect from a claim that states baldly:  “All 
                                                 
29 On plus factors, see, e.g., Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253-54 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
977, 108 S.Ct. 489, 98 L.Ed.2d 487 (1987), and cert. denied sub nom. Coastal Corp. v. Apex Oil Co., 484 U.S. 
977, 108 S.Ct. 489, 98 L.Ed.2d 487 (1987)).” 
30  Twombly, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 179-80, citing Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found., 890 F. Supp. 250, 255-56 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); Levitch v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 649, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).  
31 Twombly, 425 F.3d at 115 (citations omitted). 
32 Id at 111, n.5. 12 
defendants in the telephone industry have divided territories and fixed prices since February 8, 
1996.”  A more responsible approach, which seeks both to give notice and weed out groundless 
claims, also requires the procedural system to make some critical assessment of the costs and 
benefits of stopping litigation at the pleading stage relative to those of going forward with 
discovery.  On this matter, standard expected utility calculations suggest that it should be 
allowed to go forward only when the likelihood of a positive case is high enough to justify what 
even the Court of Appeals recognizes as the enormous costs of discovery in class action antitrust 
suits. 
I think that the useful line for approaching this question works as follows.  In those cases 
in which the plaintiff has alleged only public sources for making out its claim of collusion, the 
defendant should be able to avoid discovery and obtain a judgment on the pleadings by using the 
same documents or the same kind of evidence to show that there is no genuine issue of fact left 
to be decided on the case. In effect, therefore, discovery is appropriate only when there is some 
evidence from some nonpublic source that justifies the greater expense of the discovery on the 
case.  Although the District Court in Twombly did not articulate this test, nor even cite the 
Matsushita decision that gives it some credibility, that is exactly what it did.  Thus Judge Lynch 
wrote: “When deciding such a motion [to dismiss on the pleadings], the Court may consider 
documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated in it by reference, and such facts 
as are suitable for judicial notice pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201.”
33  He thus treated the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss as though it set up a “mini-summary judgment” that is available 
solely when the plaintiff relies on public information and its ostensible economic implications.  
In these circumstances the defendant cannot defeat the claim for summary judgment prior to 
discovery if that defense relies on private information that should be vetted through discovery.  
But so long as it relies on what we may term, to coin a phrase, “like kind,” evidence of “like 
kind” with what the plaintiff presents, the motion to dismiss, in line with the consistent 
precedents, should be squared with the emerging case law in both antitrust law and beyond.   
The point here has special relevance in Twombly because the most likely outcome of any 
discovery will be to leave this case exactly where it is at present.  As is discussed in the next 
section, all of the plaintiff class’s factual allegations are true (if vacuous).  It therefore seems 
quite possible that the situation after exhaustive discovery will remain exactly where it is today.  
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After all, if these statements are sufficient to support the inference of conspiracy, what kind of 
denials are so strong to lead to the conclusion that the case presents no genuine issue of fact.  But 
is this the kind of boilerplate case that should survive a summary judgment motion? I see no real 
benefit in allowing a case this weak to go forward to either discovery or trial on the strength of 
what, as becomes evident in the next section, are such weak allegations.  
The Second Circuit for its part, however, did not address Judge Lynch’s preferred 
approach, but played a very different game: it allowed the plaintiff to rely on the public 
information to move the case forward to the second stage, but did not allow the defendants to 
answer the factual allegations of the case on the strength of the same kind of evidence. 
 
4. The Twombly Particulars   
 
The strength of Judge Lynch’s approach is indicated by his examination of the case.  As 
noted above, the key allegation in the case is that the four defendants, each regional bell 
operating companies, have entered into a long-standing conspiracy to divide territories, which is 
a per se offense under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  I have no objection to the per se rule of 
illegality for territorial division.  But on the proof side, the plaintiff class relied only on three 
types of circumstantial evidence.
34  First, all the firms are in the same regulated industry and 
hence have frequent opportunities on which they could choose to collude.  Second, the territorial 
contiguity of the various defendants makes it easy for each to enter each other’s territories. 
Third, a newspaper story contained a quote by Richard Notebaert, an officer of one member of 
the alleged conspiracy, observing that entering the territory of another bell company “might be a 
way to turn a quick dollar, but that doesn’t make it right.”
35 
The Federal Rules were of course not designed with these modern regulatory disputes in 
mind, and notwithstanding their constant revision on matters of detailed, their basic provisions at 
issue in Twombly have remained essentially unchanged since 1938,  They did not fashion the 
rules for motions on the pleadings in light of the complex institutional setting in which modern 
high-stakes litigation is brought.  They did not have any awareness that in markets such as 
telecommunications, firms are vulnerable to extensive and constant government regulation.   
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Once the plaintiff alleges the potential gain from staying out of rival territories, the question is 
whether a trial court should put on its thinking cap to ask whether the publicly available 
information militates against that possibility.  On this question, it takes little ingenuity to come 
up with the conclusion that Judge Lynch reached in this case: none of these bits of evidence 
raises a reasonable inference of collusion when taken in light of other relevant public evidence.  
Look at each of the points in sequence. 
 
The opportunity to collude  
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant firms have extensive opportunities to collude 
with each other because they are drawn together in virtue that of the fact that they are subject to a 
common scheme of regulation.  The point of this supposed evidence, which is easily available 
for all regulated industries, is that the proof of opportunity to collude counts as a plus factor on 
the matter of collusion.
36 Yet this notion of the opportunity to collude represents only part of the 
story.  It is equally evident, and thus subject to judicial notice, that the telecommunications 
industry is a network industry in which all of its participants also have at the very least a duty to 
interconnect with each other.
37  It is quite inconceivable for any firms to engage in the 
cooperative aspects of their private businesses unless they can speak to each other on an 
extensive and ongoing basis.  This problem with network industries has long been recognized in 
setting a qualification to the usual per se rule on horizontal contacts.  The Supreme Court, for 
example, has taken the position that communication among banks involved in check-clearing 
operations cannot give rise to an inference of collusion.
38  What has to be shown is some 
evidence of communication that sought to rig prices, divide territories or restrict output.  Mere 
communication in this context has no tendency to exclude legal forms of behavior.   
Nor is this rule in the slightest bit irrational.  The ability to communicate freely is, and 
has to be, a regular part of the business for firms subject to constant administrative oversight by 
state and federal commissions.  The point has indeed already come up in connection with the 
telecommunications industry in the recent Supreme Court decision in Verizon Communications 
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
39 which reversed a Second Circuit decision on 
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motion to dismiss an antitrust claim (coincidentally written by Judge Sack), in large measure 
because the FCC oversight of the various carriers is so great as to render it likely that any 
antitrust action would create endless mischief in areas that were under the direct oversight of the 
FCC.  That case was, to be sure, an offshoot of federal preemption cases because one federal 
system was thought to displace another.  But the basic point carries over here.  There is little 
reason to think that mere opportunity to speak raises the risk of collusion when there is a duty to 
speak that is subject to extensive independent regulatory control.  The ostensible plus factor of 
communication is thus fully neutralized when that fact is set into is larger, public context. 
 
The conspiracy to exclude third parties from all local territories 
The plaintiff class also alleges that the defendants have conspired to keep all CLECs out 
of their respective territories.  Yet on this point, it is impossible to disagree with the District 
Court that as a matter of sound economic theory the evidence is worthless.  Tested against the 
“tend to exclude” standard of Matsushita, even at the pleadings stage, it is clear that neither the 
plaintiff class in its complaint, nor the Second Circuit in its review of the complaint, has supplied 
any answer to devastating critique issued by the District Court.  The public evidence used to 
buttress any inference of collusive behavior this conclusion is negated by the public evidence 
that each defendant has a powerful unilateral incentive to keep all other companies out of its own 
territory.  Aggressive defensive behavior is therefore perfectly consistent with unilateral 
behavior.   
Indeed, this conclusion is not one of mere possibility but of historical certainty.  Vast 
portions of the 1996 Telecommunications are directed toward the way in which the CLECs may 
take advantage of the interconnection, resale and unbundled network rules in order to facilitate 
competition.  Once again direct administrative oversight, not antitrust laws, offers the best way 
to deal with that issue.  The plaintiff class offers no explanation whatsoever as to why defendants 
would ever risk any collaborative behavior that carries with it exposure to treble damage actions 
when each knows that all others labor under the same incentive to exclude for their own 
territories. The plaintiff class offers the exotic theory that the ILECs have incentive to conspire 
because if a CLEC succeeds in one territory it could succeed in another.
40  But it offers no 
explanation as to what forms of collective behavior would even make sense.  There is nothing in 
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this record that detracts from the District Court’s conclusion: “Given that each ILEC has reason 
to want to avoid dealing with CLECs and having to ‘subsidize’ their entry into the market, each 
ILEC would attempt to keep CLECs out, regardless of the actions of the other ILECs.”
41 Here is 
a perfect application of Matsushita’s “tend to exclude” test based on public information only. 
The plaintiff class does not fare any better in positing that it was in the separate interest 
of each ILEC to enter as a CLEC the long-distance markets in the home territories of its rivals.
42  
The first point to note is that any assessment on a motion to dismiss should take into account the 
risks and costs associated with the alleged form of  anti-competitive conduct.  In the standard 
price-fixing case, it takes no fresh investment in new territories to make the decision to raise 
prices and to lower output.  The firm continues in the same market in much the same way as it 
has operated before.  The loss in revenues from reduced sales is more than offset by the increase 
in revenue from higher prices.  If the cartel unravels because other members cheat, then the firm 
can return to the same competitive strategy that it had adopted prior to its participation in the 
illegal conspiracy.  There is little downside apart from getting caught in the usual price-fixing 
arrangement.  Under these circumstances, a district court should show under Matsushita greater 
receptivity to a claim of this sort.   
Twombly involves territories, not prices.  On the factual side these cases are always more 
complex because the antitrust law does not impose on any firm a duty to enter the territory of a 
neighbor.
43  Firms work in many regions and in many lines of business, and they are constantly 
having to decide where to invest their capital and where not.  As a matter of basic economic 
theory, there are all sorts of reasons not to enter into a new territory that do not raise any hint of 
collusion.  In this regard it is instructive to compare these territorial decisions with the cases of 
collusive predation that did not survive summary judgment in Matsushita and Brooke Group Ltd. 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
44   
The customary account of predation rests on the sensible notion that it is highly unlikely 
that any firm will invest (current) dollars to drive out other firms in the hopes that it will obtain 
some monopoly position in the future during which time it will be able to recoup its losses in 
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(discounted) dollars.
45  The first obstacle to predation is that the lower prices of the firm will 
expand the demand for its products, thereby increasing its short-term losses. Yet in the future, 
when the firm raises prices, it has no way to ward off new entrants into its markets, which could 
include the firms that exited the market on a short-term basis during the attempted period of 
predation.  There is no way that predation makes sense for the single firm.  And there is no way 
that predation makes sense for a group of firms who have to share the losses among them.  
Indeed, if the group of firms did have a monopoly power, its better strategy would generally be 
to raise prices, not to lower them.  It was in this context that the “tend to exclude” test showed its 
power on summary judgment.  
The factual setting in Twombly is still more complex by far than those involved in 
predation.  The first point here is that each ILEC knows in advance that its fellow ILECs, like 
itself, are geared up to fight the new entrant.  Each ILEC also knows that entry into this market is 
not simply a matter of offering goods for sale at some predetermined price.  At the very least it 
requires extensive capital investments in one or more locations, which must be made in the teeth 
of resistance from the ILEC whose turf is invaded, and competition from many CLECs who seek 
to enter into the same space. There are all sorts of independent reasons why a firm faced with 
many opportunities and pitfalls would choose not to invade the territory of another firm.  The 
point was made repeatedly by the District Court, but its analysis was neither affirmed nor denied 
in the Second Circuit, which paid little attention to the underlying economics.
46 
In response to these points, the plaintiff class has noted that the peculiar pricing system 
under the 1996 Telecommunications Act allows any CLEC to purchase unbundled network 
elements at favorable prices.  It then insists, as a matter of basic economic theory, that there is no 
rational reason why an ILEC would be prepared to leave money on the table, except through an 
illicit agreement to divide territories.
47  As a matter of economic theory, this argument is flatly 
wrong once the full context, easily accessible from public sources, is taken into account.  First, as 
the plaintiff class itself alleged, all ILECs worked over time to keep new entrants from their 
territory.  That alone is a reason to be cautious about going in.  In addition, the District Court did 
not note what is also true economically: the extensive subsidies that were created under the 1996 
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Act were not uniquely appropriable by any one firm.  Any CLEC that entered the market would 
get the same deal as any other.
48  It follows that the entire statutory arrangement had two unwise 
economic consequences.  The first is that the greater the entry, the greater the cash bleed for the 
ILEC—itself a good reason not to become a CLEC in another area.  The second is that the ILEC 
turned CLEC does not get a competitive advantage over any other CLEC, all of which are 
entitled to the same preferential treatment.  Competition dissipates the subsidy.   
In addition, no ILEC is able to garner any special gains by taking on the role of a CLEC 
outside its home territory.  The District Court correctly saw that no ILEC could use the 
dominance in its own territory to gain some cost advantage when it competed elsewhere.  “Since 
being a CLEC is a different business than being an ILEC, expanding into a new area is not 
simply a question of expanding one's infrastructure, or using the existing infrastructure to 
provide the same services in a new location.”
49 In addition, no ILEC could even start long-
distance service in its home territory until it met a check list of conditions (pertaining to showing 
competitive conditions in its own territory).
50  Judge Lynch did not see, but should have added, 
that the subsidy would be competed away by other CLECs.
51  The entire situation during the 
relevant period created a perfect storm for telecommunications.  The ILECs were bled by 
immense subsidies from which the CLECs did not prosper.  It takes little imagination to find 
independent reasons why no ILEC would undertake this venture.  Any analysis of the situation 
from publicly available information thus shows that the plaintiff class has advanced no reason 
that tends to exclude independent explanations for the conduct of each named ILEC.  
 
The notebaert newspaper interview  
The last additional fact offered to explain why Twombly was not just a case of innocent 
parallel conduct was an interview that Mr. Notebaert, as President of Qwest, had with the 
Chicago Tribune.  The plaintiff class seized in its pleadings on one indiscreet sentence from that 
interview— that an ILEC’s entry into another territory “might be a way to turn a quick dollar, 
but that doesn’t make it right”—to carry the burden of an entire case.  First, territorial 
agreements, like price-fixing arrangements, are done in secret, so that it defies common sense to 
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think that any participant would announce its illegal behavior to a newspaper reporter.  Second, 
the statement does not identify who the parties of any supposed conspiracy are, when they got 
together, or how long the conspiracy lasted.  Third, any shred of conspiracy theory is rebutted by 
other quotations from the same document—public information of which the plaintiff class surely 
had notice.
52 Mr. Notebaert rightly notes that the entire pricing structure for unbundled network 
elements was “nuts,” and that it was not sustainable, which it wasn’t.  Thus in speaking of the 
resale of UNEs, Mr. Notebaert commented, “I don’t think it’s a sustainable economic model. . . . 
It’s just a nuts pricing model.”
53 
Notebaert in fact proved correct, for the entire model was thrown out shortly thereafter by 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on the grounds that it did not identify the 
circumstances in which the CLEC was entitled as of right to purchase a UNE at below market 
prices.
54 Thus United States Telecom Association v. F.C.C., invalidated a first such effort that 
previous May,
55 and United States Telecom Association v. F.C.C.,
56 ended the epic process less 
than two years later in March, 2004.  Notebaert’s full comments in this article are consistent with 
the view that he thought that the entire rate structure was sufficiently mispriced and transient that 
it would be unwise, especially for a company that had lost $219 million, to try to reestablish its 
financial position by going against stronger ILECs in their home turf.  And surely, it has to make 
sense, even at the pleading stage, to read the entire article, not just some fraction of it. 
 
Calls for congressional investigation 
Finally, it seems odd to place any weight on the calls that various members of Congress 
make for investigations of the ILECs for leaving money on the table.
57  These obvious political 
gestures are simple conclusions by individual politicians who have their own complex agendas.  
In and of themselves, they offer no new private information that would allow for a finding that 
such a combination was sensible enough for any ILEC to participate in.  To afford these 
propositions any weight is to invite well-connected lawyers to implore their political allies in 
Congress to call hearings in order to gin up some record of antitrust misfeasance.  The safe rule 
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in these cases is to disregard all political statements, except to the extent that they are subject to 
independent verification.  Nor need one rely on this general proposition, because public 
information is available which shows unmistakably that the Department of Justice, with its vast 
powers to investigate all forms of collusive behavior, thought that there was no merit to these 
allegations.
58 
In sum, the District Court used the right standards and made the correct assessment of the 
evidence when it dismissed the plaintiff class in Twombly at the pleading stage of the case.  One 
could assume that all the plaintiff class’s public evidence was true, and still be unable to draw 
any sound inference of a conspiracy, given that a full account of all public information negates 
an inference that the evidence presented tended to exclude any form of legal conduct.  The 
Matsushita standard, which was crafted in the context of summary judgment, easily carries over 
to the pleading stage given that all the plaintiff class’s circumstantial evidence proves worthless 
when placed in context.  At no time, moreover, have the plaintiffs offered any direct evidence on 
conspiracy, so that the entire case should be thrown out for the failure to mount any kind, let 
alone any plausible kind, of proof.  Proceeding to summary judgment requires an immense 
expenditure of resources, but promises to supply no  new information that improves 
decisionmaking in this case.  The extreme standard taken by the Second Circuit is manifestly 
incorrect. 
Circuit Conflicts  There is a second, if lesser, difficulty with the logic of the Second 
Circuit’s Twombly decision that is worthy of some mention.  The last time that the Supreme 
Court took a look at the summary judgment standards was arguably thirteen years ago in Brooke, 
which itself only applied the basic orientation previously set out in Matsushita  and the 
subsequent case Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.
59 which in fact only raised 
issues of the legality of public contractual practices.  In the subsequent years, the lower courts 
have diverged among themselves in setting the standard by which cases could be dismissed both 
on the pleadings before discovery has been undertaken and on summary judgment after 
discovery.  Some circuits have been too strict in their requirements for circumstantial evidence, 
while others have been far too lax.  The differential standard leads to skewed results as plaintiffs, 
                                                 
58 Antitrust Enforcement Agencies—The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Bureau of 
Competition of the Federal Trade Commission: Hearing Before the Task Force on Antitrust of the House Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 77, 79 (July 24, 2003) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General R. 
Hewitt Pate). 
59 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 21 
who enjoy a first mover advantage, systematically bring their cases in those circuits that are most 
willing to allow cases to go to trial.  This long-standing confusion leads to certain unfortunate 
dynamic consequences that undermine the effectiveness of the antitrust laws.  The plaintiffs’ 
lawyers will in many cases be able to fashion their complaint to avoid those circuits (like the 
Eighth) which have artificially high standards for summary judgment.  Yet they will flock to 
other Circuits, like the Second, whose standards for judgment on the pleadings and summary 
judgment are far too permissive.   
The effects of these two errors are therefore not identical, as the former will bite only in 
those cases where antitrust plaintiffs have no choice of circuit, while the latter will bite in 
nationwide suits where the plaintiffs have the choice of venue. This form of strategic behavior 
suggests that any circuit which is an outlier will have disproportionate influence over the entire 
process.  Most antitrust cases involve charges of conduct that takes place on a nationwide scale 
so that jurisdiction can be laid in the district courts of any federal circuit.  Skilled plaintiffs’ 
lawyers armed with a potent first mover advantage can pick the circuits most favorable to their 
position.  It follows therefore that those Circuits in which the bar for summary judgment is set 
too high will see few if any cases brought within them, while those Circuits, like the Second, 
which set the bar too low will attract numerous cases, so the two kinds of error will not be of 
equal severity.  Setting the bar too high has minor social costs, chiefly from creating and 
maldistribution of work across the circuits.  Setting the bar too low, even in one circuit, raises the 
direct prospect of opening a set of floodgates that should be tightly fastened. 
The structural problem lies not solely in the fact that the test of the Second Circuit is too 
lax.  It also lies in the use of standards that are too high.  One instance (in which the I was losing 
counsel for the plaintiffs) that shows this tendency is Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash 
Corporation of Saskatchewan,
60 in which the Eighth Circuit sustained a summary judgment 
against the plaintiffs who alleged a price-fixing conspiracy among the six major Canadian 
producers of potash. The particular evidence presented in that case included much specific 
documentary evidence about future price raises for all members of the group, correspondence 
and exchanges among high-level officials of the various companies complaining about price 
movements and threatening retaliation, and a detailed econometric study that controlled for 
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unilateral changes in output in order to show that sharp spikes in prices could only be attributable 
to coordinated action.
61  One piece of evidence in this case was a memo from the Canadian 
Potash Export (“Canpotex”), which reads in full: 
FYI Canadian potash producers have reached agreement with the 
United States Department of Commerce and all dumping action 
has been suspended for minimum 5 years.  It is rumoured that the 
USD per metric ton increase posted by Canadian producers in 1987 
to cover possible tariff payments to the U.S. Govt will be refunded 
in full or part.  In the meantime new price lists are being issued on 
Monday Jan. 11 at: Standard Grade USD 80.00; Coarse Grade 
USD 84.00; Granular Grade USD 86.00.
62  
 
To understand the significance of this memo, Canpotex is a cartel organized to sell 
Canadian potash for export on a joint basis.  Its directors are senior executives of the Canadian 
potash producers.  It is precluded by law from involvement in the sale of potash to the United 
States, and there is no valid reason for its members to discuss the subject of American prices.  
Every member of the defendants had representatives at Canpotex meetings.  It would have been 
easy for them to retire to a separate room and set prices off the record for the American market.  
In fact, these price increases were implemented by all Canadian producers into the American 
market, just as stated in the memo.  The evidence not only tends to exclude the possibility of 
mere independent behavior, but it tends to establish collusion by direct evidence.  Nonetheless, 
the Eighth Circuit, over a powerful dissent, held that neither the memo, nor the constant 
backbiting between the firms over the period of raised prices, nor the econometric study, either 
alone or in combination, raised a triable issue of fact.  The net effect of this decision was, 
without exaggeration, to require a plaintiff to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt to a judge 
in order to have the opportunity to prove it by a preponderance of evidence before a jury.  That 
decision stands in notable contrast, for example, with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in High 
Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) Antitrust Litigation,
63 which quite emphatically rejected the 
proposition that “if no single item of evidence presented by the plaintiff points unequivocally to 
conspiracy, the evidence as a whole cannot defeat summary judgment,”
64 only to allow the case 
to reach a jury on evidence that was far weaker than that in Blomkest, albeit far stronger than the 
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evidence produced in Twombly.  These two cases are both summary judgment cases, after 
discovery, which means that they raise the same issue as Twombly but at a later stage of inquiry.  
But no matter what stage the litigation, the key issue is only whether the evidence presented up 
to the time of the defendant’s motion has any tendency to support the allegations in question.  In 
most instances, the pleadings are a bad time to make that call.  In Twombly, it was not. Both 
courts that decided Twombly understood that the plaintiff was seeking to win on a hopeless 
antitrust case.  Only Judge Lynch acted on that conviction, and in ways that are limited and 
prudent.  The Second Circuit bit its teeth and narrowly limited motions to dismiss on the facts at 
the close of the pleading stage. Unless the Supreme Court intervenes now, we will only find out 
the wisdom of his decision after the lengthy and costly discovery process that he sought to 
circumvent.   
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Twombly is of course only one case.  But the larger message, which covers the vast 
amount of complex litigation that takes place daily in Federal Court should also be clear.  The 
current provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed in an earlier era for 
litigation that on average has been far simpler than the litigation today.  It operated on an 
assumption that the greater risks in civil litigation came from the premature dismissal of 
meritorious cases brought by ordinary people of little means or sophistication.  The large modern 
business dispute or class action does not fit into that template at all, for both sides are represented 
by sophisticated counsel who are able to take strategic advantage of the various options given to 
them under the law.  In this environment, the balance of convenience has changed.  Now there is 
a far greater peril of allowing litigation to go too long as well as being cut off before its times.  
The cases on motions to dismiss and summary judgment are something of a shambles because 
the weak cases are allowed to trudge on through the system while stronger ones are knocked out.  
Some calibration of the scales of error is needed to remedy this situation. 
The basic logic of decision theory is that going forward in litigation has real costs that 
should be justified only if there were some confidence that it was all worthwhile.  In dealing with 
large suits against institutional defendants, the risk is not only of a single action, but of copycat 
suits which raise the same issues in slightly different fashion in other courts or against other 24 
defendants.  It is of course clear that government abuse is a serious matter that cannot be lightly 
dismissed.  So too, without question, cartels do present serious risks, so these antitrust cases 
should normally be allowed to go forward.  But in a world in which context is key, a general 
proposition is not a uniform truth.  There are two kinds of error in all cases, and so long as the 
plaintiff relies solely on public evidence that is refuted or explained away by the same type of 
evidence (often evidence in the same documents), then the balance of error has clearly shifted.  
We do not believe that plaintiffs are entitled to make blank charges devoid of all factual content 
just to gain access to the discovery system.  That same logic, in antitrust cases and beyond, 
should lead to a dismissal at the close of pleadings in any case where the defendant has negated 
all inferences of responsibility by using the same kinds of public evidence that the plaintiff has 
used to establish a factual underpinning to the underlying complaint. 
 